- Argues against Searle (1980)
- Searle erroneously appealed to human intuition in claiming that neuro-protein is more obviously suitable for generating intentionality than silicon and metal
 - Gives examples from other areas of science (e.g. photosynthesis) where a mechanism that now seems obvious would not have seemed intuitively reasonable before the sufficient advance of science.
- Gives augmented "robot reply"
 - o says brain does not have "full-blooded intentionality"
 - some cells in the brain are known to do mechanical but somewhat intelligent tasks (e.g. visual edge detectors)
- Gives her "English reply" "to learn a language is to set up the relevant causal connections . . . between words and the world"
- Directly addresses the supposed lack of meaning in computer programs
 - because execution of a program does have actual effects, can regard it as more than formal symbol manipulation
 - o some notion of meaning and semantics can arise from these effects